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OHIO’S STANDING REQUIREMENTS AND THE UNWORKABLE
PUBLIC-RIGHTS EXCEPTION
Kristen Elia*

“Standing is not an urban legend, a myth, or a mere concept. It is a
means to access government.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Although filing a lawsuit is the first technical step in litigation,
standing is the first substantive step to a lawsuit. It is the initial gate
through which a litigant must pass in order to air his or her grievance
before a court. When a court determines a litigant is without standing, it
refuses to hear the case, despite the fact that “the claim may be correct,”
because it has determined the litigant advancing it is “not properly
situated to be entitled to its judicial determination.”2 Generally, in both
state and federal court, a litigant will have standing if she demonstrates a
(1) concrete (2) personal injury (3) caused by the defendant (4) which
can be redressed by the court. Thus, standing doctrines focus largely on
the party bringing the claim, not on the claim itself.3
Federal standing doctrine derives mainly from Article III of the
United States Constitution, which states there must be a “case or
controversy” before a court can hear a claim.4 Federal standing doctrine
is complex and changing. State courts are not required to follow federal
standing requirements; however, most states do so voluntarily.5 But,
states remain free to carve out their own standing exceptions, or to
impose heightened standing requirements where they see fit.
Ohio is an example of a state that follows federal standing but has
carved out an exception to the general, or “traditional,” standing
requirements. Under its public-rights exception, Ohio standing does not
require a plaintiff to show actual personal injury in order to sue, so long
as he presents or alleges “rare and extraordinary” issues that threaten
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 507 (Ohio 2016) (O’Neill, J., dissenting).
2. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3531.
3. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. art III, §2.
5. Brief of Amici Curiae Ohio Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants JobsOhio, et
all. at 3, ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St. 3d 520 (Ohio 2014). “Ohio courts, following
the lead of their federal brethren, have similarly adhered to formal standing requirements, not only to
protect the State’s deep interest in preserving the separation of powers, but also to ensure the efficient
presentation and pursuit of cases by the parties, and to guard against issuing advisory opinions.” Id.
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serious public injury.6 If he does so, he may bring suit on behalf of the
public, despite not being personally harmed by the alleged action.
This article details the creation of and murky history of the publicrights exception in Ohio. Part II gives a general overview of standing. It
identifies the basic standing requirements imposed on federal courts by
the Supreme Court, and compares these standing requirements with
Ohio’s. Part III addresses Ohio’s public-rights exception. It evaluates
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, which established
the public-rights exception.7 It additionally evaluates more recent Ohio
cases which address the exception—ProgressOhio, Walgate, and
Husted—in an attempt to identify and evaluate any changes made to the
exception, since its creation.8 Part IV critiques the exception’s
ambiguous meaning and argues the Supreme Court of Ohio should
abandon it, as it is both unworkable and ultimately undefinable. It
evaluates arguments for and against loosened justiciability standards,
acknowledging that while relaxed standards may work elsewhere,
Ohio’s public-rights exception’s undefined parameters make it
unworkably vague; further, it violates separation of powers principles by
conflating the judiciary with the legislative branch, and, finally, it
impermissibly infringes on the legislative branch, as is the sole province
of the Ohio General Assembly to create specialized standing rules. Part
V concludes by reiterating the importance of justiciability broadly, and
standing specifically, in the efficient resolution of appropriate cases.
II. FEDERAL STANDING AS COMPARED WITH OHIO STANDING
Standing is a complex topic whose main requirements have changed
substantially over the years. The following section briefly highlights the
three key requirements for federal standing: injury, causation, and
remedy. It outlines some of the problems courts face in evaluating these
requirements. It then addresses Ohio’s standing requirements, compares
them to the federal requirements, and introduces the public-rights
exception.
A. Federal Standing Requirements
Generally, federal standing exists where a plaintiff has “a concrete
and ripe injury” that was the result of allegedly unlawful conduct
6. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1079 (Ohio 1999).
7. Id.
8. ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1101 (Ohio 2014); State ex rel Ullmann v.
Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502 (Ohio 2016); State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich, 59 N.E.3d 1240 (Ohio 2016).
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engaged in by the defendant, that the court can redress by hearing the
controversy and issuing an appropriate remedy.9 Standing must exist at
the time the plaintiff files suit, and a court may disregard subsequent
events which cure plaintiff’s initially deficient standing.10
In the context of governmental action, which ProgressOhio
addresses, standing goes hand-in-hand with litigation asserting the
illegality of some governmental action.11 Plaintiffs often sue under the
theory that the executive or administrative action taken by a government
official “goes beyond the limits of statutory authorization or
constitutional limits,” or that a statute the official acted under “exceeds
constitutional limits.”12 Conversely, plaintiffs sue under the theory that
an elected official has refused to take an action they are required to take
as an elected official.
Standing requirements spring from two sources: constitutional and
prudential. Constitutional requirements are derived from the text of
Article III and are mandatory, while prudential factors are court-made
limitations that are “flexible” and may be relaxed by courts when
necessary.
B. Constitutional Standing Requirements
The Supreme Court has articulated a threefold test of standing under
Article III of the United States Constitution.13 Article III gives
jurisdiction to courts to hear “cases” and “controversies.”14 From this
language, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show: (1) a
distinct and palpable injury to himself; (2) that this injury is caused by
the challenged activity; and (3) that this injury is apt to be redressed by a
remedy that the court is prepared to give.15 While these requirements
tend to blend together, the focus of courts remains on the injury prong.16
One major problem with this threefold test is that these justiciability
requirements are unclear from the start, and, further, they “have
generated a large number of cases and an enormous amount of academic
commentary,”17 which has added to the challenges “that inevitably beset
9. Michael Solimine, The Ohio Constitution—Then and Now: An Examination of the Law and
History of the Ohio Constitution On the Occasion of its Bicentennial: Recalibrating Justiciability in
Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 532 (2004).
10. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at § 3531.4.
14. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
15. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at § 3531.4.
16. Id.
17. Solimine, supra note 9, at 533.
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every attempt to articulate and apply any clear principles of standing.”18
While cases and academic commentary often illuminate unclear
standards in other areas of law, the cases addressing standing have done
just the opposite—they have further muddied the already foggy
“standing” water.
The first prong—injury—requires the plaintiff to arrive at the
courthouse with some presently existing, tangible damage. Like all
prongs of the threefold test, the injury prong has developed significantly
over the years. Generally, however, injury itself is not contested, even in
public litigation cases, as the injury is usually apparent.19 Standing is
readily found when the injury is asserted to self or property.20 The
difficulty with injury arises because the injury prong blends with the
third prong—the inquiry into whether the court can and should remedy
the wrong.21 Present injury “shades into the risk of future injury, or the
denial of an opportunity that might not have led to a desired benefit,”
turning “[i]njury itself” into “a term of the standing art.”22
The second prong—causation—presents similar problems. The
causation prong has been described as “slippery,” and there is “tension”
between conceptual and pragmatic approaches to causation.23 Within the
topic of standing, as in other areas of law, causation is subject to both
uncertainty and manipulation.24 Because of the uncertainty surrounding
causation, judges may be tempted to use it as an excuse to avoid
deciding a case.25 In the words of Justice Brandeis, justiciability doctrine
provides ample opportunities for “not doing,” and causation easily
provides one such opportunity.26
Finally, the third prong—redressability—is “no more stable than the
other two.”27 The plaintiff must prove that some personal benefit will
result from a remedy that the court can give.28 One of the problems
courts have in granting remedy is that “predictions of remedial benefit
may be skewed so as to recognize, deny, or simply confuse standing,”
meaning that, similar to the causation prong, courts frequently
18. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at § 3531.
19. Id. at § 3531.4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The Supreme Court “has long required a plaintiff to assert more than the ‘generalized
interest of all citizens in constitutional governance’ to have standing.” Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
5, at 5.
23. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at § 3531.5.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1835 (2001).
27. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at § 3531.6.
28. Id.
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manipulate the uncertainty of the remedy prong in order to recognize or
refuse to recognize standing.29
C. Prudential Standing Factors
The prudential factors of standing are “non-constitutional in nature,”
and therefore may be relaxed when necessary. There are a number of
prudential requirements, and a discussion of each is beyond the scope of
this article. One important factor, however, is that litigants cannot plead
only generalized grievances, and they ordinarily may advance only their
own rights and not the rights of third parties.30
D. Broader Concerns of Justiciability
Aside from the practical difficulties the individual prongs present,
there exists a broader difficulty with standing—in part because standing
is one of the core concepts of justiciability; it therefore addresses the
“proper scope” of the court’s role in our system of government. One
commentator believes problems with standing can be attributed to the
unstable nature of public opinion on this topic; as, at any time “judges,
lawyers, and society at large divide on the proper role to be played by
the courts in addressing large public issues.”31 Opinion may shift, for a
time, in favor of judicial activism, with the majority of people (lawyers
and non-lawyers alike) believing the judiciary should have a livelier and
more involved role in deciding political controversies. At other times,
the majority view may favor judicial restraint, believing the role of the
judiciary should be narrowly confined, and judges should defer to the
legislature in almost all circumstances. Unfortunately, these broad
divisions and changing opinions are stuffed “into the narrow
terminology of standing.”32
Broader issues of the evolving and changing nature of justiciability
influence the way courts view the subsets of justiciability: ripeness and
mootness. Ripeness refers to the readiness of a case for litigation.33
Depending on the political climate of the time, courts may feel pressured
to decide cases that are not entirely “ripe,” or a case that addresses a
political concern, lest a “plaintiff's real injury go without redress or
29. Id.
30. Solimine, supra note 9, at 533.
31. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2.
32. Id.
33. “For instance, if a statute has not yet harmed a party but may do so in the future, the case is
not ripe for judicial review.” Basil M. Loeib, Abuse of Power: Certain State Courts Are Disregarding
Standing And Original Jurisdiction Principles So They Can Declare Tort Reform Unconstitutional, 84
MARQ. L. REV. 491, 496 (2000).
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public officials be allowed to continue an unlawful course of conduct.”34
This pressure to decide a politically-charged case clashes with judicial
restraint, as there are often just as many reasons not to decide difficult
issues of broad public importance. A single litigation “may not provide
sufficient information to support a wise decision” and “[a]n improvident
decision may harm more or less narrow classes of individuals who are
not before the court,” botching matters that are much better left to the
political organs of society.35 In this light, standing serves to “ensure that
a court will render its decision in ideal conditions—in a fact-specific
controversy where the court cant test its principles and precedents
against real facts” and real people, with real consequences for those real
people.36
All of the above issues—the individual prongs of standing (and their
evolving nature), the broader concerns of justiciability (and its evolving
nature), along with the particular concerns of ripeness and mootness
(and their own instability, based on political climate)—contribute to the
intricacy of standing. These issues additionally substantiate the criticism
that federal standing is “no more than a convenient tool to avoid
uncomfortable issues or to disguise a surreptitious ruling on the
merits.”37
E. Ohio Standing Requirements
State standing law, for the most part, voluntarily mirrors federal
standing law.38 This is true in Ohio as well, despite the fact that the
language of the Ohio Constitution is not analogous to Article III’s
language. The Ohio Constitution vests “the judicial power of the state”
in the courts. 39 It reads, “The courts of common pleas and divisions
thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters
and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and
agencies as may be provided by law.”40
Because Ohio’s constitution has been interpreted roughly in line with
the federal constitution, Ohio’s traditional standing exists in roughly the
same terms as federal traditional standing—where a plaintiff has
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, as to

34. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2.
35. Id.
36. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 7.
37. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2.
38. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 4-5. “This Court [Ohio Supreme Court], in turn, has
held that federal principles of standing apply to cases brought in Ohio state courts.” Id.
39. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1.
40. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B).
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ensure that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution.”41 That is, a plaintiff must have (1) an injury that
takes the form of a “personal stake in the controversy,” and is therefore
not just a generalized grievance shared by the majority of the
population, (2) that can be redressed by the court.
Additionally, because states remain free to craft their standing
requirements as they see fit, they may require additional factors in
certain situations.42 For example, Ohio has added three requirements
when a plaintiff wants to attack the constitutionality of a piece of
legislation. These added requirements are: (1) the private litigant “must
generally show that he or she has suffered or is threatened with direct
and concrete injury in a manner or degree different from that suffered by
the public in general;” (2) that “the law in question has caused the
injury;” (3) and that the relief requested will redress the injury.43
Conversely, states may relax standing requirements when appropriate.
Ohio has created a particularly unique exception to traditional standing
requirements, called the “public-rights” exception. This exception
lessens the general threshold of standing in certain circumstances; it
“departed from federal doctrine” by “lower[ing] the thresholds of
justiciability” when the issue brought by the litigant is of a certain
magnitude.44 The exception allows a plaintiff to bring suit despite the
fact that he or she has suffered no personal injury if the suit falls within
the “rare and extraordinary” situation where the public interest is at
stake.45 Thus, it allows a plaintiff to bring a generalized grievance, if the
issue is of enough importance to the public at large.
III. CASES ESTABLISHING THE PUBLIC-RIGHTS EXCEPTION
The following section describes and evaluates the Ohio cases
establishing or modifying the public-rights exception. It begins with
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, which established
the exception. It then examines more recent cases, which loosely address
the exception without significantly modifying or further defining it, but
also without finding standing under it. It concludes by summarizing
where the exception is today, based on the current case law addressing
it.
41. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1081 (Ohio 1999).
42. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 3.
43. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1081.
44. Solimine, supra note 9, at 532.
45. The Supreme Court of Ohio refers to this exception as a “means to vindicate the general
public interest.” Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1083.
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A. The Founding Public-Rights Case: State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward
Sheward established the public-rights exception in Ohio’s standing
doctrine. In Sheward, the plaintiffs-relators46 filed an original action in
prohibition and mandamus against six Ohio common pleas court judges,
in their official capacities and as representing those similarly situated.47
Plaintiffs-relators challenged the constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. No.
350, a comprehensive and lengthy tort-reform bill.48 In their complaint,
plaintiffs-relators asserted eight claims, but their primary claim was that
the bill constituted an improper legislative usurpation of judicial power,
and was therefore an intrusion into the exclusive authority of the
judiciary, in violation of various sections of the Ohio Constitution.49
More specifically, they argued the bill violated Ohio’s separation of
powers principals by reenacting a piece of legislation previously found
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Defendants filed
motions to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff-relators lacked standing.50
Defendants argued the plaintiffs-relators failed to allege the kind of
personal injury necessary for standing in Ohio, and that they merely
pleaded “insufficient generalized public interest” which did not meet the
personal injury requirement.51
The court found both that the plaintiffs-relators had standing and that
the bill was unconstitutional “in toto.”52 On the standing issue, the court
allowed the action to proceed as a “public action,” the goal of which is

46. The plaintiffs-relators were: The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers (OATL), Ohio AFL-CIO,
Richard Mason, and William A. Burga. Id. at 1062. A “relator” is someone who files a mandamus or
quo warranto proceeding, a proceeding which requests someone show by what warrant they hold an
office or position. Black’s Law Dictionary, available at: http://thelawdictionary.org/relator/.
47. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1062.
48. Id. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3867, was passed by the Ohio Senate on
September 11, 1996, and by the Ohio House of Representatives on September 26, 1996. The bill was
then signed into law by former Governor George Voinovich on October 28, 1996. It took effect on
January 27, 1997. The bill attempted civil justice reform in Ohio. It amended, enacted, and repealed
over one hundred sections of the Ohio Revised Code dealing with laws on torts and other civil actions.
The changes addressed: the interest on judgments, immunity and liability of political subdivisions,
liability for the condition of premises open to the public for accessing growing agricultural produce,
sales of securities and class action requirements there for joint and several liability, contributory and
comparative fault, assumption of risk and apportionment of damages, among many other things. Id. n2
and n6.
49. Id. at 1062.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1080.
52. Id. at 1088; The court found the legislation unconstitutional for intruding upon judicial power
by declaring itself constitutional, reenacting legislation the Court previously struck down as
unconstitutional and by interfering with the Court’s right to set court procedure. Because of these
violations, the bill violated Ohio Constitution’s separation of powers provision. Id at 1076.
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to enforce a “public right.”53 It held it would entertain a public action in
“the rare and extraordinary” case in which plaintiffs challenge the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment “on grounds that it operates,
directly and broadly, to divest the courts of judicial power.”54 Finally,
the court held that outside of the case at hand (dealing with legislation
infringing upon the judicial role), where a plaintiff brings an action, the
object of which “is to procure the enforcement or protection of a public
right, the relator need not show any legal or special individual interest in
the result, it being sufficient that relator is an Ohio citizen and, as such,
interested in the execution of the laws of the state.”55
In creating the exception, the court discussed traditional standing at
length, in an effort to justify its departure from it. It addressed the way
in which standing intersects with broader concerns of justiciability and
the role of the court in our system of government. It explained that
“standing embodies general concerns about how the courts should
function in a democratic system,”56 and that these concerns “become
more acute” when “there may be an intrusion into areas committed to
another and coequal branch of government.”57 Here, the court implied
that although the role of the court is generally limited to deciding only
actual cases or controversies that come before it (generally involving
private parties), it needs to step out of these narrow bounds when the
legislature assumes judicial authority.58 It cautioned that this power to
declare legislative acts unconstitutional is a “power burdened with a
duty,” not a higher power or act of superior wisdom on the part of the
court.59 For this reason, the court further warned, when the private rights
of a person or property are not at issue, the court must be careful that it
is not “simply asked to regulate the affairs of another branch of
government.”60
The court further explained the need for additional requirements when
challenging the constitutionality of legislation. In the majority of cases
brought by a private person, the overarching question revolves around
whether that person has enough of a stake in the controversy so “as to
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1079.
55. Id. at 1084-1085.
56. Id. at 1080.
57. Id at 1081. “It has been long and well established that it is the duty of every judicial tribunal
to decide actual controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts and to render
judgments which can be carried into effect. It has become settled judicial responsibility for courts to
refrain from giving opinions on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by judgment of
premature declarations or advise upon potential controversies. The extension of this principle includes
enactments of the General Assembly.” Id at 1080.
58. Id.
59. Id at 1081.
60. Id.
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ensure that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution.”61 So, when a private person wants to attack the
constitutionality of a piece of legislation, the court must toe a fine line in
order to avoid invading the rights of another coequal branch. For this
reason, the court has held that the private litigant “must generally show
that he or she has suffered or is threatened with direct and concrete
injury in a manner or degree different” from the injury suffered by the
general public.62 Further, of course, the litigant must show that the law
in question caused the injury, and that the relief he requests of the court
will redress the injury.63
After outlining these background standing principles, the court
explained its break with federal standing requirements. It explained that
although the federal requirement for injury is “grounded” in the
constitutional requirements of Section 2, Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, federal standing is not binding on state courts, as “[the
Ohio Supreme Court is] free to dispense with the requirement for injury
where the public interest so demands.”64 While standing requirements
are binding in federal courts, standing in state courts is merely “a selfimposed rule of restraint.”65 So, according to the court, states need not
“become enmeshed in the federal complexities and technicalities” of
standing, which impede the swift adjudication of valid claims.66 Instead,
the court explained, state courts can dispense with these frustrations in
favor of “just and expeditious determination on the ultimate merits.”67
Thus, the court clarified that it could, and should, cast off the burden of
federal standing and craft an exception in the interest of public justice.
The court further suggested that this new exception is not novel in
Ohio jurisprudence. It claimed to have a longstanding tradition of
allowing issues to be litigated “in a form of action that involves no
rights or obligations peculiar to named parties” when they “are of great
importance and interest” to Ohio’s population.68 It explained this
tradition in terms of “public” versus “private” rights. It held that where a
public right, as differentiated from a purely private right, is involved, the
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1082. For example, a litigant has the right to sue to enforce the performance of a public
duty, because, as a matter of public policy, a “citizen does have such an interest in his government as to
give him capacity to maintain a proper action to enforce the performance of a public duty affecting
himself and citizens generally.” Id at 1083.
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citizen suing “need not show any special interest therein” and may sue
simply as a citizen.69 Finally, the court clarified that the public-rights
doctrine exists independent of any statute authorizing it.70
Applying the newly-formed exception to the case at hand, the court
held that, because the bill usurped judicial authority, the issues in this
case were of enough importance to the public to justify allowing
plaintiffs-relators to bring the action as a public action. The court held
that the people of Ohio, through their constitution, “delegated their
judicial power to the courts, and have expressly prohibited the General
Assembly from exercising it.”71 In the court’s view, if the General
Assembly could reenact legislation previously held unconstitutional by
the court and could require the courts to treat those pieces of legislation
as valid and uphold them, “‘the whole power of government would be at
once become absorbed and taken into itself by the legislature.’”72
The dissenting judges emphasized that the plaintiffs-relators lacked
traditional standing and the court therefore should not have heard the
case, let alone create the exception. As one commentator notes, although
the dissenting justices were “not directly addressing the prior ‘public
rights’ cases of the court,” the dissent “appeared to argue that the
majority had improperly expanded the scope of the public-rights
exception.”73
B. ProgressOhio v. JobsOhio
In ProgressOhio, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that ProgressOhio,
a nonprofit organization, did not have standing to sue JobsOhio, a
“public-private development corporation” which, in essence, privatized
the former Ohio Department of Development as a way to attract greater
economic activity to the state.74 ProgressOhio alleged JobsOhio violated
constitutional prohibitions on spending, corporate creation, and
corporate investment.75
The court analyzed standing both in terms of traditional standing and
public-rights standing. It first held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
under traditional standing requirements; it believed ProgressOhio had no
69. Id. at 1083; see also State ex rel. Cater v. N. Olmstead, 631 N.E.2d 1048, 1054-1055 (1994)
(holding a taxpayer has standing to enforce the public’s right to proper execution of city charter removal
provisions, whether or not he receives any private or personal benefit).
70. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1083.
71. Id. at 1084.
72. Id.
73. Solimine, supra note 9, at 539.
74. Joshua Crabtree, Behind Closed Doors: An Argument for State Constitutional Standing to
Challenge Public—Private Development Corporations, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1423, 1423 (2015).
75. ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1101, 1103 (Ohio 2014).
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direct, personal stake in the outcome of the case.76 It held that mere
“ideological opposition” to a program or legislative enactment is not
enough to satisfy standing.77 So, because ProgressOhio did not prove a
personal stake in the outcome, it therefore lacked the direct injury
necessary to give it common-law standing.78
Additionally, addressing the public-rights exception, the court found
appellants did not qualify for it. It found they did not present an issue of
public interest important enough to fall under the Sheward exception.79
The court explained that the public-rights exception is extraordinary; it
eviscerates the personal-injury prong of standing, as it “provides that
‘when the issues sought to be litigated are of great importance and
interest to the public, they may be resolved in a form of action that
involves no rights or obligations peculiar to named parties.’”80 Because
it is an abrogation of the traditional injury-prong, in order to succeed in
bringing a public-rights case, the litigant “must allege ‘rare and
extraordinary’ issues that threaten serious public injury.” It explained
that, even if likely illegal, not “all allegedly illegal or unconstitutional
government actions rise to this level of importance.”81 Thus, the court
implied that plaintiff’s claim fell into this latter category—even if the
legislation they challenged was illegal or unconstitutional, it was not
extraordinary enough to qualify.
Finally, plaintiff’s action was a declaratory-judgment action, and the
public-rights exception applies only to original actions in mandamus and
or prohibition. Therefore, aside from the fact that the litigants did not
present a rare and extraordinary issue justifying use of the exception,
they brought the wrong kind of action.
Thus, ProgressOhio seems to “narrow[] the public-right doctrine to
apply only to original actions in mandamus and/or prohibition” that
present the kind of rare and extraordinary public issues needed to invoke
the exception.82
C. State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich
In Walgate, a number of plaintiffs, both private and institutional, sued
Ohio Governor John Kasich and various Ohio lottery organizations

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1105.
Id.
State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 507 (Ohio 2016) (O’Neil, J., dissenting).
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(collectively “the state”).83 Plaintiffs raised 17 claims in their amended
complaint, and sued under the theory that numerous pieces of
legislation, which established casinos in Ohio, were unconstitutional.84
The Supreme Court of Ohio held only one of the litigants had
standing to sue. Plaintiffs alleged standing based on the “negative
effects of gambling.”85 The court rejected this argument, pointing out
that “negative effects of gambling that appellants allege[d] [did] not
constitute concrete injuries to appellants that are different in manner or
degree from those caused to the general public, [and] were not caused
by the state's conduct, and cannot be redressed by the requested relief.”
86
Similarly, it held they did not have standing based on status as an
Ohio public school teacher or parent, or as contributors to “special
funds” for schools.87 It analyzed all of their standing claims under
traditional standing requirements, and did not address the public-rights
exception.
The dissent did address the public-rights exception, arguing it should
83. State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich, 59 N.E.3d 1240 (Ohio 2016). Plaintiff-appellants were
“Robert L. Walgate Jr., David P. Zanotti, the American Policy Roundtable (“Ohio Roundtable”), Sandra
L. Walgate, Agnew Sign & Lighting, Inc. (“ASL”), Linda Agnew, Paula Bolyard, Jeffrey Malek,
Michelle Watkin-Malek, Thomas W. Adams, and Donna J. Adams.” Id. at 1243-1244. They filed a
complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and were originally “seeking a declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus. In January 2012, those parties, along with
plaintiffs-appellants, Joe Abraham and Frederick Kinsey, filed an amended complaint in the case. The
amended complaint named as defendants (appellees here) Governor John R. Kasich; the State Lottery
Commission; the interim director and members of the State Lottery Commission; the Casino Control
Commission; the chairman, vice chairman, executive director, and members of the Casino Control
Commission; and Ohio Tax Commissioner Joseph W. Testa (collectively, “the state”).” Kasich, 59
N.E.3d at 1244.
84. “The first ten claims relate to the constitutionality of VLTs and H.B. 1, the act that
authorized them. Those claims allege, in part, that (1) VLT operation exceeds the state's authority to
conduct lotteries, (2) the lottery commission will violate the constitution by not conducting VLT games
in their entirety, (3) the net proceeds of VLT games will be distributed in an unconstitutional manner,
(4) allowing VLTs to be operated by racing facilities will violate the prohibition against the state's
financial involvement in private enterprise, (5) H.B. 1 violates the one-subject rule of Article II, Section
15(D) of the Ohio Constitution , and (6) in enacting H.B. 1 the General Assembly failed to comply with
the requirement in Article II, Section 15(C) of the Ohio Constitution that each House consider every bill
on three different days.
Claims 11 through 16 in the amended complaint challenge legislative actions that relate to
Ohio's four casinos, particularly H.B. 277 and H.B. 519. Included in these are claims that legislation
pertaining to the commercial-activity tax, casino-license fees, and tax exclusion for promotional gaming
credits, as well as legislation allowing for multiple casino facilities in one city and graduated payments
of the required initial investment, exceeded the legislature's constitutional authority.
The final claim in the amended complaint is that Article XV, Section 6 of the Ohio
Constitution, H.B. 1, H.B. 277, and H.B. 519 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by granting a monopoly to the gaming operators whom
the state approved.” Id. at 1244.
85. Id at 1245.
86. Id. at 1247-1248.
87. Id. at 1251.
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have applied to give the litigants standing, regardless of the substantive
strength of their claims. Justice Pfeifer argued, “[t]his case is of great
interest to the public” because it involved a piece of legislation in which
“over 3,000,000 Ohioans cast a vote.”88 Because of the importance of
the legislation, based on the voter turnout, “the litigants deserve the right
to be heard.”89 Thus, Justice Pfeifer implied (without explaining fully)
that “rare and extraordinary” issues are presented, thus triggering the
exceptions application, where plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of
legislation that a mass amount of citizens voted for.90
Justice Pfeifer addressed the argument that, if the exception were
applied here, it would open the courtroom doors to anyone who wanted
to challenge any piece of legislation. He argued that while Ohioans
should not have the unlimited ability to challenge provisions of the Ohio
Constitution, the court should not be concerned with an “avalanche of
cases asserting public-rights standing” because the court has shown
previously that it is able “to reject frivolous, inconsequential, or inane
claims.”91 Here, he believed the court should hear the claim because the
litigants brought before the court “significant and important issues that
affect millions of Ohioans.”92 For this reason, the court “should not
throw up its hands and sputter ‘but these people have not suffered a
differentiated harm.’”93
D. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted
In Husted, a plaintiff again attempted to challenge the JobsOhio act;
the court again refused to find standing. It held that the trial court
properly dismissed a citizen’s mandamus action, as the citizen lacked
standing under the public-rights exception and alleged no concrete
injury which would give her traditional standing.94 She alleged the act
was illegal because Ohio’s wholesale liquor business funded JobsOhio,
so those who purchase liquor in Ohio are “forced” to fund JobsOhio.95
The Court rejected this argument. It first addressed the general
88. Kasich, 59 N.E.3d at 1255 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1255.
93. Id.
94. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 504 (Ohio 2016);Id.; A citizen’s mandamus
action is a petition to a superior court, requesting it issue an order to a lower court, government body or
corporation, requiring or forbidding it from doing something; The JobsOhio act, as mentioned elsewhere
in this article, authorized the creation of a nonprofit organization for the purposes of promoting
economic development, job creation, retention, and training, and recruiting business to Ohio.
95. Id. at 504. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 504 (Ohio 2016).
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requirements for standing, and differentiated them from the public-rights
exception. It said that “traditional standing ‘requires litigants to show, at
a minimum, that they have suffered “(1) an injury that is (2) fairly
traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to
be redressed by the requested relief.”’ 96 Further, standing depends not
on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, but rather on “‘whether the
plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy that they are entitled to have a court hear their case.’”97 The
court then articulated the Sheward exception to the “personal stake”
(injury) requirement.98 It reiterated that to qualify for this exception, the
plaintiff must allege “rare and extraordinary” issues that “threaten
serious public injury.”99 Further, the court clarified that the exception
only applies to original actions in mandamus or prohibition (as
suggested in ProgressOhio).
The Husted plaintiff alleged she had standing under both the
traditional test and the public-rights exception because she was a citizen,
taxpayer, business owner, consultant, elector of Ohio, and a person who
has purchased alcohol in Ohio in the preceding six months.100 She
asserted that “a private party has standing under the public-right doctrine
to seek to force the attorney general to act when a conflict of interest
prevents him or her from doing so.”101 The court found she already
waived any argument of traditional standing, and even if she had not
waived it, she alleged no concrete injury sufficient to satisfy it.102
Further, she did not meet the public-rights exception because she
misapplied precedent. The precedent she cited—State ex rel. Trauger v.
Nash—did not support her assertion of public-rights standing.103 In
Trauger, the private citizen’s mandamus action charged the governor
with failing to fulfill his statutory duty to appoint an elector to fill the
spot of lieutenant governor.104 Here, plaintiff alleged R.C. 2733.04
“imposes upon the attorney general the duty to file an action in quo

96. Id. at 505.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 506.
102. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 506 (Ohio 2016).
103. Plaintiff cited State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 64 N.E. 558 (1902). In that case, the private
citizen’s mandamus action alleged the governor failed to fill a vacancy which he was legally bound to
fill. Here, however, the plaintiff was alleging that R.C. 2733.04 imposes on the attorney general the duty
to file an action in quo warranto. Id. at 506. This is incorrect because the duty to file an action in quo
warranto is subject to the attorney general’s discretion in deciding whether an action can be established
by proof. Id.
104. State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 64 N.E. 558 (1902).
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warranto.”105 But, R.C. 2733.04 gives the attorney general discretion to
file a quo warranto case when he “has good reason to believe” such a
case “can be established by proof.”106 So, Trauger did not support her
assertion of standing under the public-rights doctrine.107 Finally, her
other public-rights arguments mirrored those made in ProgressOhio,
and the court determined there that those arguments were insufficient (as
they did not allege rare and extraordinary issues that threaten serious
public injury).108
The dissent, however, argued that without looking at the merits of the
plaintiff’s claim, the court could not determine that her case did not have
issues of great importance to the general public, which would give her
standing under the public-rights exception.
E. State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State
On January 24, 2018, in a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court of
Ohio decided State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State.109 In it, the
court vehemently criticized Sheward without overturning it, denouncing
its holding as “questionable” and its possible repercussions as
“egregious and problematic.”110
In State ex rel. Food and Water Watch, Food and Water Watch
(“FWW”) and FreshWater Accountability Project (“FWAP”) filed a
complaint on behalf of their members, requesting a writ of mandamus to
compel certain government officials to promulgate rules relating to the
storage, recycling, treatment, processing, and disposal of waste
associated with oil and gas drilling.111 Under Revised Code 1509.03(A),
the chief of the oil and gas resources management division of the Ohio
Department of Natural Resources (“ODNR”) “shall adopt” rules
regulating the operation of oil and gas wells and production facilities.112
The rules must address certain drilling safety measures and must govern
the issuance of permits for the handling of certain waste materials.113
105. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 506 (Ohio 2016).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State, 100 N.E.3d 391 (Ohio 2018).
110. Id. at 398.
111. Id. at 393. Respondents-appellants included Rick Simmers, the chief of the oil-and-gas
resources-management division of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, and James Zehringer, the
director of ODNR. Id.
112. Id. at 394
113. Id. The rules must address including safety in well drilling and operations, protection of the
public water supply, and containment and disposal of drilling and production waste. R.C.
1509.03(A)(1), (2), and (4). The chief is additionally required to adopt rules regulating the storage,
recycling, treatment, processing, and disposal of brine and other waste substances. R.C. 1509.22(C).
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FFW and FWAP sued under the theory that the ODNR had not issued
the rules required by the statute; specifically, they alleged ODNR had
not issued rules regulating the permit process for handling and treating
waste issued by oil and gas operations.114 In lieu of issuing rules
regulating permits, the ODNR had instead allowed facilities to operate
under a “temporary authorization,” which was to remain effective until
the division chief issued rules under R.C. 1509.22(C).115
Adopting a magistrate’s suggestion that plaintiffs could not establish
traditional standing based on injuries alleged by their members, publicrights standing, or taxpayer standing, the Tenth District Court of
Appeals granted summary judgment to the state officials.116 On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Ohio, FFW and FWAP alleged they had
standing based on three theories.117 Relevant to this article is FFW and
FWAP’s argument that they had standing to force the enforcement of a
public right and therefore did not need to show individual interest or
injury.118
FWAP invoked the public-right exception, but argued that the court
should not apply Sheward’s “rare and extraordinary” requirement,
reasoning that, unlike the relators in Sheward, it was not challenging the
overall constitutionality of a regulation, but was merely seeking a writ of
mandamus to have it performed.119 The court noted that it has not
granted a public-rights exception under Sheward in 15 years.120 It held
that “[e]ven assuming that this court would still grant a party a publicright-doctrine exception to standing” in an appropriate case, “FWAP has
not met its burden to demonstrate that this case is a ‘rare and
extraordinary case’ worthy of the exception.”121
Aside from rejecting plaintiffs’ argument, the court seems to have
constrained Sheward further.122 It described Sheward as a “deeply
divided” four-to-three decision, one in which the court held it would
entertain a public action only in the rare and extraordinary situation
Finally, the rules must govern permits issued for the handling or brine and “other waste substances.” Id.
114. State ex rel. Food & Water Watch, 100 N.E.3d at 394.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 395.
117. Id. They argued that they met traditional standing requirements by having members injured
by the “deprivation of their rights under R.C. 1509.22 and the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act. The
court rejected this argument and affirmed the Court of Appeals and found the plaintiffs lacked
traditional standing (through their members). It held that the health injuries alleged in the affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs members were abstract “or suspected,” and were not concrete enough to confer
standing under standing’s injury prong. Id. at 397.
118. Id. at 395.
119. Id. at 398.
120. Id. at 399.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 398.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 5

1036

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

where the challenged statute operates “directly and broadly to divest the
courts of judicial power.”123 Thus, the court emphasized the contentious
nature of the case, the specific facts presented in it, and the extreme
narrowness of Sheward’s actual holding.
Significantly, the court also addressed the fact that standing
exceptions can lead to abuse through unwise and unasked-for judicial
policy-making. It discussed the fact that when issues brought before the
court are of such importance to the public that they are resolved without
standing, it “can unfortunately result in ‘political opportunism, allowing
the majority to invalidate a disfavored law using a questionable
approach.’”124 It feared “Sheward essentially allows this court to engage
in policy-making by ruling on the legislation of the General Assembly”
where there has been no injury caused by the legislation.125 Even more
suggestively, the court seems to have come close to overruling the case
as a whole, describing any authority provided by the case as “at best,
questionable.”126 Finally, it harped on the potential for the exception to
lead to the court issuing advisory opinions, a result the court described
as the “more egregious and problematic abuse,” which long-standing
Ohio law prohibits.127
F. The “current” criteria (as gathered from the original and the more
recent cases addressing the exception).
The cases establishing and applying the public-rights exception are
not clear on exactly what that exception is or when it can be used.
Sheward seems to say that the public-rights exception is something Ohio
courts have recognized in the past, yet “until 1954 only one of the cases
referred to a ‘public right,’ and in any event the cases are not legion.”128
The following section pieces together the parameters of the exception,
as created in Sheward and amended in later cases.
Sheward was decided in 1999. It allows for a “public action,” in
which plaintiffs seek to enforce a “public right” even where the
individual has not suffered any injury because of the challenged action.
It held the court would entertain these kinds of actions in “the rare and
extraordinary” case in which relators challenge the constitutionality of a
legislative enactment “on grounds that it operates, directly and broadly,
to divest the courts of judicial power.” Thus, the exception exists in the
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Solimine, supra note 9, at 543.
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“rare and extraordinary” case where a plaintiff (an Ohio citizen or
groups of citizens) seeks to vindicate a public right and presents issues
of “great importance” that threaten “serious public injury.”
ProgressOhio, a case decided in 2014, restated the core language of
the exception without doing anything to change it. In ProgressOhio, the
court described the exception as one that exists only “when the issues
sought to be litigated are of great importance and interest to the
public” and plaintiffs “must allege ‘rare and extraordinary’ issues that
threaten serious public injury” to qualify for the exception. The only
clarity this case may have contributed to the exception is in the court’s
statement that “Not all allegedly illegal or unconstitutional government
actions rise to this level of importance.” So, ProgressOhio did little
more than parrot back the vague language employed by the court in
Sheward. It did nothing to define what qualifies as a “rare and
extraordinary” issue or what passes as a “serious” public injury. It did,
however, narrow the public-right doctrine to apply only to original
actions in mandamus and/or prohibition.
The court in Walgate, decided in March 2016 held a group of
plaintiffs did not have standing to sue the state over legislation
establishing casinos. The court did nothing in Walgate to change or
amend the public-rights exception, as it analyzed all of plaintiffs’
standing arguments under traditional standing tests. The dissent argued
the court erred in ignoring the exception, and that plaintiffs raised issues
that were important enough to enough Ohioans to warrant standing
under the exception. While the dissent addressed the importance of the
issues (in that millions of Ohioans voted on the bill), it did not provide
any further guidance on what makes an issue important more generally.
How many millions need to vote on an issue to raise it to the level of
significance needed to invoke the exception? If only one million, instead
of three million, had voted for this bill, would the dissent have
considered it important enough? Finally, it similarly did not address the
“serious public injury” prong of the exception.
Husted, another case decided in 2016, likewise did little to add to the
exception’s definition. It held the plaintiff did not have standing under
the exception because she misapplied precedent, and her other publicrights standing arguments mirrored those rejected by the court in
ProgressOhio. Thus, it did nothing to clarify or amend any part of the
exception.
Finally, in Food & Water Watch, decided in 2018, the court appears
to have stood on the precipice of overruling Sheward, and instead chose
to further undermine its central holding and chip away at its
applicability. The court suggested that it will likely never apply Sheward
again, noting that it has not done so in 15 years and that plaintiffs’ issue
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did not rise to rare and extraordinary, even assuming the court would
still grant a party a public-right-doctrine exception to standing in any
case. It emphasized that it would entertain a public action only in the
rare and extraordinary situation where the challenged statute operates
directly (and broadly) to divest the courts of judicial power, that
Sheward provides questionable authority “at best,” and that its use
should be avoided so the court does not run afoul of Ohio’s prohibition
on advisory opinions. Thus, the court here emphasized that Sheward’s
holding was intended to apply only to situations in which an enactment
threatened to divest the judicial branch of its power and that the ground
on which it originally stood was “deeply divided” and “questionable.”
In sum, the exception exists today in essentially the same amorphous
form as it was when Sheward was decided. It allows for standing when a
plaintiff brings a “public action” in mandamus or prohibition, presenting
“rare and extraordinary” issues that threaten “serious public injury.”129
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO SHOULD ABANDON THE PUBLICRIGHTS EXCEPTION
The following section addresses a few of the numerous reasons why
the Supreme Court of Ohio should abandon the public-rights exception.
The reasons begin narrow and broaden, arguing first that practically
speaking, the exception is so vague and undefined that it cannot
realistically be applied. Next, it addresses broader constitutional
concerns, arguing that the exception violates longstanding separation of
powers principles by impermissibly expanding the scope of judicial
authority, and lastly that the Ohio General Assembly is capable of, and
is charged with, the duty of crafting specialized standing rules in
enacting legislation.

129. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio has, in one other instance, granted
standing under the public rights exception. In the case of State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of
Workers' Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981 (2002), a union and union president sought to prevent enforcement of
H.B. 122, a law permitting warrantless drug and alcohol testing of injured workers. The court found
standing under the exception because it found the issue presented a public right of sufficient magnitude.
The law affected every injured worker in Ohio who sought to participate in Workers’ Comp. Further, it
affected everyone who worked in Ohio because every worker could be subject to “unreasonable
searches,” and the right to be free from unreasonable searches constitutes a “core right” (as it is
fundamental enough to be embodied in the Bill of Rights). Because the focus of this article is on recent
decisions, this decision is not discussed at length. See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of
Workers' Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981 (2002).
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A. The Public-Rights Exception Is Unworkably Vague130
Some commentators argue that judicial flexibility in standing is
appropriate, for a number of reasons.131 One key argument in favor
this broader conception of justiciability at the state court level is that
increased access to the courts will inspire increased political
participation “by facilitating adjudicative practices that afford
additional avenues for political expression and that provide an
alternative point of entry into political life.”132 The argument goes
that when people have access to “the public space of the courtroom,”
they can “find themselves engaged and mobilized through the
transformative effects of a deliberative discourse.”133 In this light,
courts serve to continually construct and reconstruct social life itself
and loosened justiciability gives citizens an increased role in public
decisionmaking by giving voice to “dissident and plural views.”134
Although the ideas above have merit in the abstract, and may work
for some state systems and some judicially-crafted standing
exceptions, the fact is that Ohio’s public-rights exception has proved
itself unworkable in practice. The above noted proponent of the
loosened theory of justiciability acknowledges that “additional
scholarship is necessary to translate these broad aims into doctrinal
standards and manageable rules.”135 Unfortunately, Ohio’s muddied
history with the exception reveals that the public-rights exception is not
one such “manageable rule.”
The public-rights exception has no set parameters, making it nearly
impossible to apply. Sheward itself, the exception’s founding
decision, defines the public-rights exception in vague, abstract
130. Under Ohio law, precedent may be overturned if it satisfies three requirements. These
requirements, as laid out in the Galatis decision, are: “(1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time,
or changes in circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision, (2) the decision
defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the precedent would not create an undue hardship for
those who have relied upon it.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 216-217 (Ohio
2003). Although the following sections only address the unworkability of the exception, arguments can
and have been made that Sheward satisfies all three of the above requirements. For more information,
see Brief of Amici Curiae Ohio Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants JobsOhio, et all. at
18-2120, ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St.3d 520 (Ohio 2014).
131. This article addresses a key argument in favor of expanded standing doctrines: increased
political involvement by providing an avenue for citizens to involve themselves in the political process
and air their differing views. Additional arguments include: the idea that increased access to courts
promotes community and “public goods,” curbs curb faction-dominated decisionmaking, and cures
“adverse externalities and spillovers.” For a fuller analysis of all arguments in favor of loosened
justiciability, see Helen Hershkoff’s article, supra note 26.
132. Hershkoff, supra note 26, at 1917.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1919.
135. Id. at 1930.
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language, referring to “rare and extraordinary issues” threatening
“serious public injury.” As one commentator notes, “‘public rights’”
are difficult to objectively define,” let alone apply.136 Yet, neither the
Sheward decision nor any later case addressing the exception further
defines what kind of issues qualify as “rare” or “extraordinary.”
Although Sheward sets the exception as narrow, it gives no guidance
on when a court should apply the exception.137 It essentially “sets
litigants and jurists down a seemingly endless path of unfettered court
access, leaving traditional standing rules in their wake.”138 The problem
of how to apply Sheward “plagues every case where Sheward’s public
rights exception is invoked.”139
For example, the plaintiffs in the ProgressOhio case, while invoking
the exception, struggled with how to frame the Sheward holding.140
They argued there was no way of declaring one public right more
important than another, and contended that even the drafters of the Ohio
Constitution would have disagreed as to what public rights were the
most important.141 If neither the courts, nor plaintiffs, nor,
hypothetically, the drafters of the Ohio Constitution, can make sense of
the exception, surly jurists cannot be the ones expected to make sense of
it all.142
The ambiguity and amorphous nature of the exception may be due
to the court’s extreme desire to strike down the legislation at issue in
Sheward. One commentator suggests “the court simply desired to
address the issue of tort reform and was willing to disregard decades of
consistent, sound law in order to do so,” instead of waiting for a party
with a cognizable injury to challenge the new legislation and striking it
down as it had when it initially declared the legislation
unconstitutional.143 Thus, the court created the exception solely for the
purpose of reaching the merits of Sheward. In this light, Sheward is
merely part of “the court's on-going trend of controversial discourse and
irresponsible judicial activism” and was likely not meant to set down
any legitimate exception which could be used or applied in the future.144
136. Brief of Amici Curiae Ohio Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants JobsOhio, et
all. at 18, ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St. 3d 520 (Ohio 2014).
137. Id. at 20,
138. Id. at 21.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Jonathan I. Blake, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward: The
Extraordinary Application of Extraordinary Writs and Other Issues; The Case That Never Should Have
Been, 29 CAP. U.L. REV. 433, 476 (2001).
144. Id. at 477. This idea may be further bolstered by the fact that public rights exceptions are not
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Instead, it was a “quick-fix” to the problem at hand—striking down, for
the second time, the unconstitutional tort reform bill. The court had
neither incentive nor desire to set down anything other than what the
exception is today, vague and elusive.

B. The Exception Violates Separation of Powers Principles
Separation of powers is one of the most important governmental
constraints, both at the federal and state levels. It is a constitutionally
based doctrine designed to uphold the limited role of courts in a
democratic society.145 It ensures that each of the three branches of
government function only within its own sphere of power, and that
none usurps power reserved for the other two.146 The Ohio
Constitution, like the federal Constitution, adheres to the separation
of powers. It abides by the idea that each branch must “endeavor to
cabin its powers and responsibilities to those appropriate for the
particular branch.”147
Traditional standing requirements protect the separation of powers.
They “are not simply ends in themselves.”148 They both “reflect and
enforce the separation of powers.”149 The judicial branch is charged
with resolving legitimate legal disputes. Traditional standing, which
requires injury, causation, and a remedy which the court can give,
“ensure[s] that the judicial branch stays within its authority to decide
actual legal disputes rather than opine on abstract, generalized
matters dedicated to the legislative branch and the political
process.”150 It ensures the court addresses the concrete issue before
it—a citizen, injured by defendant, seeking legal redress. Standing
rules prevent parties with no personal stake in the outcome from
initiating legislation on behalf of the public generally.151 Were the
judiciary to address every question under the constitution, it “might
take possession of ‘almost every subject proper for legislative
discussion and decision” and could lead to stand-offs between the
a trend in other jurisdictions. Instead, “[s]ince Sheward was decided, other States have declined to adopt
such an exception.” Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 20.
145. John Roberts, Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220 (1993).
146. “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government
than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). The Ohio Constitution, modeled after the federal one, similarly respects
the bounds of separation of powers.
147. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 9.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 8.
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branches of government.152 One commentator described the Sheward
decision as “an external clash between the legislature and the judiciary .
. . over the proper scope of judicial power.”153 This commentator
believed “both branches fired their best shots in stubborn attempts to
assert their respective fortitude.”154 This result—branches “firing shots”
at each other—is what separation of powers was designed to prevent.
Traditional standing rules not only protect the separation of
powers, they also ensure that decisions overturning pieces of
legislation carry their proper weight. The court undoubtedly has a
responsibility to determine the constitutionality of actions by the
other branches of government. This “power of constitutional
adjudication is secured exclusively in the judiciary as a check upon the
other branches of government.”155 However, this duty is served best
“when the parties present a genuine dispute to the judiciary, not a
request for an advisory opinion.”156 The judiciary can best carry out
its duty to check the other branches when presented with a concrete
injury, as its decision will carry the full weight and power of judicial
authority, having come from the “ideal” judicial process. Citizens
should not be able to invoke the judicial system in order to serve the
purposes of interest groups or to resolve ideological differences
through “concerned bystanders,” instead of through those who are
actually affected by a judgment.157
In addition, practically speaking, traditional standing ensures that
the limited resources of the court system are used properly.158
Justiciability “serves a signaling function” to plaintiffs, deterring some

152. Id. at 6. Further, Ohio standing requirements should always mimic federal ones. The “logical
interpretation in the state constitution is that it tracks federal standing requirements” Id. at 9. The Ohio
Constitution does not allow for advisory opinions, although the constitutions of many other states do.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ohio has disclaimed the right to make advisory opinions. Id. So,
“neither the plain text of the Ohio Constitution nor any information about the adoption, ratification, or
original public meaning of the relevant provisions justifies departure in Ohio from the application of
federal standing requirements.” Id. Finally, the court “has a long history of following federal standing
requirements when interpreting what grounds must be shown for a plaintiff to bring a case in Ohio
courts” Id. at 10. The Supreme Court of Ohio adheres to federal cases from 1910 to the present time.
Where the provisions of the two constitutions are similar and there is no reason to differ their
interpretations, the Court has interpreted the Ohio constitution in line with federal standing precedent.
Id.
153. Basil Loeib, Abuse of Power: Certain State Courts are Disregarding Standing and Original
Jurisdiction Principles So They Can Declare Tort Reform Unconstitutional, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 491, 491
(2000).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 504.
156. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 8.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 32.
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from and encouraging others to file claims.159 Relaxed standing
requirements changes this signal, thus increasing the number of suits
filed “without ensuring their merit.”160 Were citizens able to challenge
legislation simply as taxpaying citizens, they could “simply carry []
political fight[s] to the courts” and overload the courts’ dockets.161 This
concern becomes particularly acute when one considers the fact that
state courts already manage larger dockets than federal courts do. With
relaxed standing, added burden on state courts “could cause the
allocation of judicial resources to shift in unfair and inefficient ways.”162
The judicial system’s decisions carry the most weight both when they
address concerns that fall squarely within the scope of their duty and
when their resources can be appropriately focused on these concerns
they are charged with resolving.
While traditional standing protects separation of powers, the
public-rights exception blurs the line between the judicial and
legislative branches. The exception allows the court to decide the
constitutionality of a legislative act where the person asking for
review of the act has not been genuinely affected by it in any way. In
essence, the person has a generalized grievance dressed up as a legal
matter, seeking the court to resolve what the legislature is charged
with dealing with. The Sheward court overreached its constitutional
bounds, and essentially “enable[d] the court to embody its opinion in
law—the exclusive province of the legislature.”163

C. The Ohio General Assembly Has The Power To Grant NonTraditional Standing
Not only is it the General Assembly’s duty to create substantive
law, but it also has the authority to grant specialized standing. Ohio’s
General Assembly is the lawmaking body of the state. As such, it has
the power, when enacting legislation, to craft specialized standing
which would allow citizens to invoke the power of the courts even
when they are not personally injured by the legislation.164 Much like
Congress can in enacting federal legislation, Ohio’s General
Assembly has the power to “cloak parties with the degree of personal
interest necessary to satisfy standing requirements” by enacting a
statute allowing them to sue, where traditional standing doctrine
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Hershkoff, supra note 26, at 1932.
Id.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 4.
Hershkoff, supra note 26, at 1932.
Blake, supra note 124, at 479.
Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 3.
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would bar their suit.165
Further, Ohio’s history shows that the legislature is willing to do
this, as there are a number of situations in which the General
Assembly has granted specialized standing.166 In one instance, it has
authorized county taxpayers to sue in some cases where the county
prosecutor fails to do so.167 Thus, there is already a degree of
flexibility built into standing doctrines, which allows non-injured
parties to invoke the power of the courts.168
Finally, the legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to
“weigh the necessity, and the advantages and disadvantages, of such
provisions.”169 A court, when deciding a case, is under significant time
constraints; a legislature, when writing and debating legislation, is not.
Ultimately, plaintiffs need personalized grievances to come before
the judiciary, but “No one needs standing to petition the political
branches (legislative and executive) to enact, repeal, enforce or not
enforce laws or policies.”170 Generalized grievances, shared by the
public at large, should always channel through the political process.
V. CONCLUSION
To many, justiciability exists in the abstract, as some vague and
looming concept of “the role of the courts,” to be discussed and
debated in a classroom as an “academic indulgence.”171 Standing,
however, has real implications in the practical, day-to-day workings
of courts across the nation, and in Ohio specifically. Standing,
ripeness, mootness, and all the other subsets of justiciability “serve as
gatekeepers to the state courthouse.”172 They determine whether
significant public questions can be brought before a court, and, if so,
who may bring them and at what time. Undoubtedly, public questions
involving the constitutionality of certain pieces of legislation can and
should make their way before the judiciary. However, those bringing
these questions need to be the right parties—that is, they need to be
parties legitimately affected, in a concrete way, by the issue they bring.
Exceptions to this rule conflate the branches of government and take
from the legislature its duty to craft specialized standing rules. The
165. Id. at 12.
166. Id. at 13. Additionally, the legislature “has authorized municipal taxpayers who seemingly
lack traditional standing to bring suit when the municipality decides not to do so” in R.C. 733.59. Id.
167. Id. See also R.C. 309.13.
168. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 13.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 6.
171. Hershkoff, supra note 26, at 1838.
172. Id.
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Sheward exception, hastily forged in the need of a passing moment, and
impossible to define or apply outside of that moment, is an
unsustainable departure from traditional standing, and should be
abandoned as such.
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